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264 Faith and Philosophy 
it is rational to believe that God does not exist and not rational to believe 
that God does exist. In the book we don't find how to sort this out. My 
guess is that Gellman would insist that atheism is not strongly rational; 
and that is OK, but he hasn't given us sufficient reason for thinking that 
theism is strongly rational and atheism is not. He claims to have shown 
that it is not reasonable to believe that God does not exist (p. 3), but I did 
not find an argument for that in his book. Gellman also does not 
address what I think is an important question concerning his position. If 
not everyone perceives God, wouldn't those who do perceive God be in 
a different position epistemically from those who do not? I think that 
the best we get from Gellman is an argument for something which is a 
bit stronger than what he calls the "weak rationality" of theism; namely, 
that on some application of the canons of rationality it is rational to 
believe that God exists. This, I believe, he has shown, and in a new and 
insightful way. He would have to provide much more for us to be able 
to see the stronger conclusion. I look forward to his future efforts in that 
direction. 
NOTES 
1. Principle BEE: If a person, S, has an experience, E, which seems (phe-
nomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or an object of kind, K), then 
everything else being equal the best explanation of S's having E is that S has 
experienced 0 (or an object of kind, K), rather than something else or noth-
ing at all (p. 46). 
2. Principle STING: If a person,S, has an experience, E, which seems 
(phenomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or of an object of kind, K), 
then our belief that S's having experienced 0 (or an object of kind K) is the 
best explanation (everything else being equal) of E, is strengthened in pro-
portion to the number of purported experiences of 0 there are and in pro-
portion to the variability of circumstances in which such experiences occur 
(pp. 52-53). 
Religion and Contemporary Liberalism edited by Paul J. Weithman. 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. Pp. viii and 315. $48.00 (cloth) 
PETER L.P. SIMPSON, City University of New York 
This book consists of a collection of essays by a distinguished cast of 
contemporary scholars. The essays are, in order: an introduction by Paul 
Weith man on Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect; Robert 
Audi on the State, the Church, and the Citizen; Sanford Levinson on 
what Liberalism demands of the Religiously Oriented Judge; Martha 
Nussbaum on Religion and Women's Human Rights; Philip Quinn on 
Political Liberalisms and the Exclusion of the Religious; Nicholas 
W olterstorff on rejecting what Liberalism tells us about Speaking and 
Acting in Public for Religious Reasons; Timothy Jackson on Liberal 
Theory and Religious Pluralism; Jorge Garcia on Liberal Theory, Human 
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Freedom, and the Politics of Sexual Morality; Jean Bethke Elshtain on the 
Question Concerning Authority; John Coleman on Deprivatizing 
Religion and Revitalizing Citizenship; David Hollenbach on Politically 
Active Churches and Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Normative 
Approach. 
These essays were originally given as papers at a conference on the 
topic of religion and contemporary liberalism at the University of Notre 
Dame in 1995. The book is, therefore, in the words of the editor in his 
introduction, the "proceedings" of that conference. One immediate merit 
that the book has as a result is that its contents have a fairly clear unity 
and fit together rather nicely. Indeed the book has something of the 
character of a single process of argument tending towards a single con-
clusion. The conclusion is that secular or a-religious liberalism is erro-
neous, incoherent, even dangerous, and that, properly understood, liber-
alism needs religion to flourish and survive. The resulting moral (implic-
it rather than explicit) is that liberal states should do much to encourage 
religious practice and belief. This conclusion and moral are, of course, 
not shared by all the essayists; in fact Audi and Nussbaum argue for the 
opposite conclusion and moral. But the criticism mounted against them 
on the other side is collectively overwhelming. Moreover this criticism 
rests not merely on philosophical analysis and argument but also on 
empirical research. For one of the features of these essays is that they do 
not just come from philosophers and theologians, but also from lawyers 
and sociologists. It is instructive to have in one volume, alongside philo-
sophical argumentation, some statement and discussion of relevant legal 
practice and sociological data. 
The book begins with a comprehensive introduction by the editor, 
Paul Weithman, who usefully isolates the theme of the book, gives an 
overview of each of the essays, brings together the results of the discus-
sion, and ends by suggesting where the discussion might go from here. 
This introduction, which is in fact longer than several of the essays, is 
well worth having, but most of it is probably better read last than first. It 
is more of an essay in its own right and even a continuation of the book 
than an introduction to it. Perhaps indeed most of it should have come 
at the end and a briefer introduction taken its place at the beginning. 
At all events, the main subject of discussion in the book is character-
ized by Weithman as the "liberalism of reasoned respect." This charac-
terization proves, by the end of the book, to be not a little ironic. For sev-
eral of the essays argue in effect, as indeed does Weithman himself in his 
introduction, that the liberalism in question is not particularly reason-
able nor particularly respectful. What is distinctive about it, as 
Weithman explains, is that it attempts to found political arrangements 
only on such principles and values as all citizens can reasonably respect. 
Religious principles and values are not, therefore, going to be allowed 
by this liberalism to form the foundation of sQciety or to be appealed to 
in political discourse about basic matters of justice and rule. For, given 
the pluralism of the modern world, religious principles are, it is alleged, 
unlikely to be such as all citizens can reasonably respect. 
This sort of liberalism is, of course, especially associated with the 
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work of John Rawls. Rawls is indeed much discussed (and criticized) in 
this collection, but the liberalism of reasoned respect is presented and 
defended in it by Robert Audi. Audi's essay, therefore, suitably comes 
first after the introduction. The liberalism of reasoned respect, argues 
Audi, imposes quite definite restrictions on appeals to religion in public 
discourse. Specifically it requires that, where laws or policies restrictive 
of human conduct are concerned, one should refrain from advocating 
any such laws and policies unless, in addition to whatever religious rea-
sons one has, one also has, and can present, adequate secular reasons, 
and unless one is sufficiently motivated by secular reasons. In arguing 
thus Audi is more anti-religious than Rawls. For Rawls would not 
require that a religious person be motivated by secular reasons; he thinks 
it enough that there should be such reasons and that the religious person 
should be ready, if necessary, to present these reasons in arguing pub-
licly for his case. Rawls would also, unlike Audi, put comprehensive sec-
ular reasons on the same level as religious reasons and rule out appeal 
to both in the advocacy of laws and policies if those reasons could not 
reasonably be respected by all citizens. For what matters for Rawls is 
that one should conform to the requirements of public reason, not to 
those of Audi's secular reason. So, for instance, Audi's position would 
allow one to appeal to utilitarianism in one's advocacy of certain restric-
tive laws but not to Christianity, while Rawls' position would reject 
appeal to both. Philip Quinn in his essay is quick to point out the unfair-
ness of this position of Audi's: the religious are penalized but no one 
else is who holds controversial views (and utilitarianism is as controver-
sial in liberal societies as religion). 
Still, even Rawls would exclude appeal to religious reasons in some 
cases, namely those where no reasons acceptable to the non-religious 
were also forthcoming. The liberalism of reasoned respect is thus com-
mitted, as several of the essayists point out, to imposing a sort of "gag-
rule" on religious discourse in public life. Instead of such "exclusivist" 
liberalism Quinn would prefer an "inclusivist" one. So also would 
Sanford Levinson. Both argue, by instructive appeals to legal theorists 
and to legal practice, that liberalism can and should give everyone an 
equal right to argue on the basis of any controversial belief, whether reli-
gious or non-religious (Levinson does, it is true, think that judges in par-
ticular are required to exercise some restraint in this regard, though, 
unlike Audi and Rawls, he does not wish to lay down any absolute rules 
on the question). Those who are not persuaded by argument based on 
controversial beliefs will not suffer any infringement of rights (since no 
one is being forced to accept what others say). Indeed listening to the 
widely different views of others can be an enlightening experience, even 
if one is not persuaded-and more so if one is. To deny this or to try to 
prevent the presentation of controversial beliefs in public is to go against 
J.S. Mill's argument that discovery of truth requires the free exchange of 
all opinions, controversial, offensive, or not. It is surely ironic that mod-
em liberals like Rawls and Audi should, in their professed concern for 
freedom, end up arguing down Mill himself. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff is harder against the liberalism of reasoned 
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respect than Quinn or Levinson. The fear of religious wars that liberals 
evince and which they often use in arguing for liberalism (as Rawls does 
in particular) is, he says, outmoded. Maybe that fear was legitimate in the 
seventeenth century, but now our fear should be of secularism, which is 
what in fact has been behind the slaughter, torture, and brutality of our 
present century. Religion by contrast has been behind most of the 
reforms and revolutions that liberals profess to admire. Even in the sev-
enteenth century, Wolterstorff points out, liberalism was not in fact secu-
lar, as is evident in Locke. It has not been secular in the American tradi-
tion either. Secular liberalism (as one might better call the liberalism of 
reasoned respect) is a very recent and very dubious invention and is itself 
as controversial, if not more controversial, than religious belief. The 
silencing of religion in the public square has, says Wolterstorff, led to a 
debasement of public life and discourse to private and group egoisms. 
Timothy Jackson takes up the same theme of judging secular liberal-
ism by its fruits and finds it similarly wanting. He proposes instead a 
perfectionist and Christian liberalism, as he calls it, developed in part by 
appeal to ideas found in Origen and Aquinas. Jackson discovers in these 
authors the openness to pluralism and difference that secular liberals 
profess to admire, but in them this openness is based precisely on the sort 
of religious convictions that secular liberals would be required by their 
theory to banish from the public square. The religious convictions in 
question are about the infinite transcendence of God's goodness, which, 
while a unity in itself, requires an endless plurality of individual things 
in order to be mirrored; about God's creation of precisely such a plurality 
of individuals; and about the profound respect and love that is therefore 
due to that plurality. Love of the individual, which is integral to any lib-
eralism, is more securely rooted in religion than in its opposite. Besides, 
argues Jackson, Rawls' liberalism in particular is self-referentially incon-
sistent (while the religious liberalism advocated by Jackson himself is 
not). Since Rawls' theory is itself enormously controversial it cannot itself 
pass the demands of public reason that it seeks to impose on religion. By 
his own criterion Rawls ought not to advocate his own theory in public. 
Jorge Garcia focuses his attack on recent work defending rights to 
sexual freedom by Thomas Nagel. These rights too, like Rawls' theory, 
are latecomers on the scene and have no precedent in previous liberal 
understandings of rights. Garcia pointedly calls them the "liberties of 
the Baby Boomers./I Nagel, as spokesman for these liberties, seems to 
want a thousand sexual fantasies and experiments to bloom more or less 
without restriction but he fails, contends Garcia, to consider just what 
the consequences are likely to be. If sexual fantasy and experimentation 
are allowed to run free will this lead to more respect for others and in 
particular for women? Will it lead to less harassment, less victimization, 
less rape? Sex is a powerful passion that has indeed its place in human 
life but only where the possibilities for abuse can be controlled and min-
imized. That place is marriage and not Nagel's fantastic experiments. 
Pope John Paul II, like Nagel, also sees sex as expressive, as Garcia 
points out, but as expressive of familial love, not fantasy, and as existing 
between persons who, whether young or old, are all equally made in the 
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image of God. Which is the more human view? Which is more likely to 
foster respect for persons and thereby to form the basis for a stable, just 
society? Moreover, continues Garcia, if it is some underlying consensus 
that, following Rawls, we must look for, are we not more likely to find it 
in the religions that already now dominate contemporary life and that 
see all men as made in the image of God than in the elaborately argued 
and little agreed-on theories of academic philosophers? 
That we need religious faith to shore up our democratic institutions is 
argued also by Jean Bethke Elshtain. Our present age, she notes, is losing 
faith in democracy and secular liberals tell us that the cure is to remove 
religious faith from the center of democracy. The truth is the reverse. 
Democracy can only survive and avoid collapse into anarchy or tyranny, 
or both, if people believe in democracy and willingly submit themselves 
and their free action to the authority of democratic principles. It is reli-
gious faith that has historically educated people to accept democratic 
authority and democratic discipline. Elshtain appositely appeals to de 
Tocqueville in support. She could have as easily and as appositely 
appealed to George Washington or any of the Founding Fathers, who 
were all keenly aware of the dependence of free institutions on religious 
belief and who regularly appealed to such belief in their public dis-
course. It is interesting to speculate how much of Washington's public 
career would have been curtailed if Audi and Rawls had been around at 
the time to impose on him their respective "gag-rules." The words "so 
help me God," for instance, which presidents now say as the final part of 
their oath of office were not there when Washington first took the oath. 
He added them spontaneously himself and everyone has followed suit 
since-and rightly too. 
What the other essayists argue about religion and liberalism by appeal 
to reason, the final two, John Coleman and David Hollenbach, argue by 
appeal also to recent empirical research. Both show the considerable 
extent to which healthy democratic practices, above all people's active 
participation in the political process, depend in fact on churches and 
church-attendance. It is curious that such research has not entered into the 
reasonings of secular liberals, for since their claim is in large part an 
empirical one (that secularism is necessary for making democracy healthy 
and stable) they ought to consider whether the empirical evidence sup-
ports that claim. Coleman and Hollenbach show that it does not. 
Secular liberalism professes to be a neutral arbitrator between com-
prehensive and rival visions of the good life. It is a neutral arbitrator 
because, as its proponents claim, it is not itself such a comprehensive 
vision. But in fact, of course, as many of the essayists point out, it is such 
a comprehensive vision. What differentiates it from other visions is that 
it tries in its rhetoric to hide the fact while they do not. Secular liberalism 
is a sort of wolf in sheep's clothing. This is made particularly clear by 
Martha Nussbaum. Her essay is rich in stories about the way religion 
has allegedly been used to oppress women. Some of these stories are 
indeed poignant, even tragic. They are, however, one-sided. Nussbaum 
tells us nothing about the many ways religion has improved the lot of 
women nor about the many ways liberalism is now itself oppressing 
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women. Cases in point are divorce, contraception, and abortion (which 
in their effects, to say nothing of their nature, are disproportionately 
damaging to women). Nussbaum appeals to the words of John Paul II to 
support her views about freedom but she ignores his words about the 
evils of divorce, contraception, and abortion. In fact, in the case of con-
traception, she wants to stop the Pope and religious authorities general-
ly from publicly speaking out against it. For contraception, she says, is a 
basic human right for women and any religious leader who speaks in 
public fora against it should be criticized as a "subverter of the constitu-
tion" (she does not say this about those who speak against abortion, but 
only, it seems, because some third world feminists speak against it). 
Nussbaum seems almost to be biting her tongue when she writes thus. 
From the general tone of her remarks one might rather think she was 
about to preach an anti-religious crusade or jihad. 
Most of the essayists in this collection go after Rawls and / or Audi. 
Nussbaum is left untouched, which is curious for she is more open and 
up-front about what secular liberalism entails in practice than either of 
them. She makes it more explicit that secular liberalism is both a com-
prehensive doctrine and a novel doctrine, and a doctrine moreover that 
is going to oppress religion and the religious whenever it feels itself 
strong enough to do so. She makes it clearer, therefore, that secular liber-
als are the enemies of liberty that George Washington warned us against 
in his Farewell Address. Fortunately for the vast majority of Americans 
secular liberals are a minority voice in the country, and indeed in acade-
mia too. But this book is a timely reminder of the threat they pose. In 
this, as in other respects, it is a welcome contribution to the important 
discussion now going on about freedom and religion, about their rela-
tions and interdependence. 
Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body 
Problem. David Ray Griffin. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
California University Press, 1998. Pp. xv and 266. $45.00 (Cloth). 
LEEMON McHENRY, Loyola Marymount University 
Ever since Descartes failed to answer the persistent but insightful ques-
tions of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia as to how the mind and body 
interact in the pineal gland of the brain, philosophy has been left with 
what Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," arguably the problem of 
modern philosophy. The sophistication of neuroscience and computer 
models of the brain in the past twenty-five years has certainly stimulat-
ed interest in the problem, but emerging scientific orthodoxy has been 
one-sided. Physicalistic materialism appears to be the only serious alter-
native to Cartesian dualism mainly because, according to Griffin, it is the 
paradigm of both wishful and fearful thinking: "wishful" to the extent 
that we believe what we want to be true-in this case, that all phenome-
na in the universe will be explained finally by materialistic laws; "fear-
